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GENCE IN DIAGNOSIS RESULTING IN Loss OF CHANCE TO LIVE BE A

COMPENSABLE INJURY?-Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
In the early afternoon of July 22, 1965, 16-year-old Theodore
Cooper, was struck by a truck while bicycle riding. Later that day,
complaining of head and back injuries and having vomited, he was
taken by his mother to the defendant hospital's emergency room where
he was examined by co-defendant Dr. Hansen, who conducted a visual
examination, tested the boy's reflexes and grip, and ordered head x-rays
which proved negative. Although advised of his patient's vomiting and
the injury to the back of his head, Dr. Hansen did not visually examine
the back of his head. Advising Cooper's mother to monitor the boy's
condition and return him to the hospital if his condition changed, Dr.
Hansen sent the boy home where, early the next morning, he died
of a basal skull fracture resulting in intracranial pressure and hemorrhage due to a swelling of the tissues in the back of his head.
Decedent's mother, as administratrix of his estate, sued Dr. Hansen,
the Emergency Professional Service Group of Good Samaritan Hospital, and the Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., doing business as
the Good Samaritan Hospital,' alleging that Dr. Hansen was negligent
in his examination and diagnosis of decedent's injuries, and that such
negligence was "directly and proximately" the cause of his death.2 The
idea behind plaintiff's theory was that Dr. Hansen's failure to properly
diagnose decedent's injury and subsequently sending him home,
deprived decedent of the chance for surgery necessary to save his life.
Evidence was submitted which showed that decedent's "vital signs"
-blood pressure, pulse, temperature and respiration-were never inspected, although, according to plaintiff's expert, this procedure was
required. There was additional expert testimony which supported
plaintiff's contention that Dr. Hansen's examination "'was not complete.'
The trial court's findings of fact were in accord with this testi4
mony.
On the issue of whether Dr. Hansen's alleged negligence was the
"proximate cause" of Cooper's death, one of plaintiff's experts testified
"1

I

Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97

(1971).
2 Id. at 246-47, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
3 Id.

at 247-48, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
4 Id. at 249-50, 272 N.E.2d at 101-02.
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that, while there is practically a 100 percent mortality rate without
surgery for patients with injuries similar to decedent's, " 'there certainly
is a chance and I can'tsay exactly what-maybe some place around50%
-that he would survive with surgery.' -5 Another of plaintiff's experts
testified that it was impossible to determine " 'with any degree of certainty' "whether decedent would have survived with the proper medical
treatment. 6 This was the sole evidence of causation produced by plaintiff
and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that "'the evidence of
proximate cause was insufficient to make a prima facie case for submission to the jury,' " 7 and a verdict was directed for defendants.
The verdict was affirmed by the court of appeals and, pursuant
to an allowance of a motion to certify the record, the case went to the
Ohio Supreme Court which also affirmed. As to the question of negligence, the court found that "there [was] sufficient evidence for the submission of that issue to the jury."" However, on the issue of proximate
causation, the court said that "to comport with the standard of proof
of proximate cause, plaintiff... must prove that defendant's negligence,
in probability, proximately caused the death,"9 and took note of the
fact that there was no evidence to the effect that decedent probably
would have lived with proper surgery. Thus, the court refused to
equate a chance of survival of "maybe some place around 50%" with a
probability of surviving, and was unpersuaded by the theory that the
negligent destruction of a substantial possibility of survival would
satisfy the proximate cause requirement, or alternatively, that a loss of
"chance of recovery" would constitute a compensable injury.
A rule, which would permit a plaintiff to establish a jury question on the issue of proximate cause upon a showing of a "substantial possibility" of survival, in our judgment, suffers the same
infirmity as a rule which would permit proof of a "chance of recovery" to be sufficient. 10
Rejecting these causal concepts, the court pointed out the infirmity
in plaintiff's proof under the traditional standards:
"Maybe 0 * * around 50%," in our judgment does not provide a
basis from which probability can reasonably be inferred. The use
of the words, "maybe" and "around," does not connote that there
is probability; those words, in the context used, could mean either
Id. at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 249, 272 N.E.2d at 102.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 252, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
10 Id. at 251, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
5
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more than 50%, or less than 50%. Probable is more than 50% of
actual. 1

Although the Cooper court spoke of the plaintiff's burden in terms
of "proximate cause," it is important to note that the problem, more
fundamentally, was that of proving "causation-in-fact." This latter inquiry basically involves one factual question: "Has the conduct of the
defendant caused the plaintiff's harm?"' 12 Proximate causation, on the
other hand, is more a question of policy: it is "merely the limitation
which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct."' 18 Perhaps the most often applied label to this
court-imposed limitation is "foreseeability."' 14 Therefore, proximate
cause issues will deal with the question of whether the consequences of
defendant's negligent act were foreseeable,' 5 or, even more difficult, was
the party injured a "foreseeable plaintiff"?0
Although causation is basically a fact question, it necessarily involves some conjecture on the part of the trier of fact. It has been
observed that proof of a cause-effect relationship is nothing more than

" 'the projection of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow
certain antecedents merely because we had observed these sequences on
previous occasions.' "17 However, courts have long recognized that the
fact that A precedes B does not mean that A caused B.'8 Consequently,

the Restatement (Second) of Torts has established a minimum criterion
requiring that, in order to find a defendant's negligent conduct to be

a legal cause of an injury, the trier of fact must find that "his conduct is
11 Id. at 253, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
12 W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971); see Cole, Windfall and
Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 459 (1964); Green,
The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MicH. L. REV. 543 (1962); Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); Probert, Causation in the
Negligence Jargon:A Plea for Balanced "Realism," 18 U. FLA. L. REY. 369 (1965).
18 W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 41, at 236. Works on proximate cause are bountiful,
see Id. at n.1.
14 See, e.g., Fuerst, Foreseeability in American and English Law, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 552 (1965); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1401 (1961);
Annot., 155 A.L.R. 157 (1945).
15 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 43, at 250-70; Payne, Foresight and Remoteness of Damage in Negligence, 25 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1962); Note, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HAv. L. Ra,. 633 (1920).
10 The most famous case in this field, if not in all of tort law, is Palsgraf v. Long

Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See W. PRoss-R, supra note 12, § 43, at 254-60
for a discussion of this case with accompanying citation of the numerous articles in point.
17 W. PRossER, supra note 12, § 41, at 242 (quoting from 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BrANNICA
Causality 61, 62 (14th ed. 1929)).
18 See, e.g., Ballenger v. Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S.C. 463, 466, 40 S.E.2d 681, 682

(1946).
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a substantial factor in bringing about the harm."' 19 This criterion has
been further qualified by the Restatement so as to indicate the minimal
relationship between negligent conduct and harm that must necessarily
be established to deem such conduct a "substantial factor":
§432. Negligent Conduct as Necessary Antecedent of Harm
(1) ...[T]he actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.
Section 432(1) is popularly referred to as the "but for" test, 20 which
courts have found to be most useful in situations where the defendant
has failed to provide some safeguard for the protection of the injured
party. Some illustrations of this application are provided by Professor
Prosser: 21 defendant's negligent failure to fence off a hole in the ice
is found not to be causal in the drowning of runaway horses upon a
22
showing that the fence would not have restrained them anyway;
defendant's negligent failure to have a lifeboat ready is found not to
be the cause of the drowning of a man who sinks immediately upon
28
falling into the ocean.
A canvasing of malpractice suits in which causation is an issue
reveals that, in the majority of cases, the inquiry concerns itself with
whether defendant's negligent conduct has set in motion some instrumentality which has injured the victim as opposed to injury from some
instrumentality for which the defendant was not responsible. 24 However,
the "but for" test has its "greatest play" in malpractice cases which
involve failure on the part of a defendant doctor to "arrest" or "pre19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

20 W. PROaSsra, supra note 12,

431(a) (1965).

§ 41, at 238-41; Malone, supra note 12, at 64-68; Note,

Medical Malpractice-Rejection of the "But for" Test, 45 N.C.L. REV. 799 (1967).
21 W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 41, at 238-41.
22 Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 Wis. 614, 54 N.W. 1091 (1893).
23 Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 232 Mass. 400, 122 N.E. 389 (1919); see Probert, supra
note 12, at 372-74.
24 See, e.g., Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 376
(8th Cir. 1959) (allegation that defendant doctor's negligent administration of mixture of
glucose and water allowed air embolism into bloodstream and was the cause of brain
damage); Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 224 So. 2d 236 (1969) (allegation that defendant
doctor's negligent administration of oxygen during operation was the cause of brain damage); Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 260 A.2d 825 (1970) (allegation that defendant
dentist's negligent procedures in tooth extraction were the cause of patient's tetanus infection and eventual death); Lenger v. Physician's General Hosp., Inc., 438 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969), aff'd, 455 S.W.2d 703 (1970) (allegation that separation of colon was due to
negligent feeding of solid food after surgery); Rose v. Friddell, 423 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) (allegation that defendant doctor's negligent setting of fractured arm caused
Volkmann's contracture); Glazer v. Adams, 64 Wash. 2d 144, 391 P.2d 195 (1964) (allegation
that defendant doctor's negligent use of diagnostic tool was cause of perforated esophagus
and eventual death).
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vent" some instrumentality before the injury occurs.2 5 Thus, the
plaintiff in Cooper tried to demonstrate a causal relationship by attempting to prove that, had the doctor properly diagnosed decedent's
injury and the surgery been performed, the death would not have
occurred.
Perhaps the most difficult, as well as the most criticized, 26 aspect of
the "but for" test is that it requires the trier of fact to speculate as to
what would have happened in the absence of defendant's conduct.
The permissible range for conjecture is unlimited. We can
never be absolutely certain that our estimate is correct. The point
at which we might be satisfied can be expressed in many ways,
such as "barely possible," "possible," "not unlikely," "as possible
27
as not," "probable," "highly probable" or "virtually certain."
The jury's ability to-theorize is limited to a certain extent by the courts'
general agreement as to what the law requires:
He [plaintiff] must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable
basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the
result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough ....

[I]t is enough that he introduces evidence from which
reasonable men may conclude that it is more probable2 8that the
event was caused by the defendant than that it was not.

Note that "probable" was the criterion of proof required by the Cooper
court in its application of the "but for" test; it would not allow
the case to go to the jury unless there was "sufficient evidence showing
that with proper diagnosis, treatment and surgery the patient probably
29
would have survived."
25 Green, supra note 12, at 559. See, e.g., Bender v. Dingwerth, 425 F.2d 378 (5th Cir.
1970) (allegation that defendant doctor's failure to diagnose seriousness of decedent's heart
condition was the cause of heart attack and ensuing death); Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal.
2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951) (allegation that defendant doctor's failure to properly diagnose
and treat decedent's brain injuries was a proximate cause of death); Ramberg v. Morgan,
209 Iowa 474, 218 N.W. 492 (1928) (allegation that defendant doctor's failure to properly
diagnose decedent's brain injuries resulted in delay in treatment and eventual death);
Walden v. Jones, 439 S.W.2d 5.71(Ky. 1968) (allegation that defendant doctor's failure to
properly diagnose patient's condition deprived him of proper treatment and led to
eventual paralysis); Harvey v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 2 N.W.2d 483 (1942) (allegation that
defendant doctor's failure to properly diagnose nature and extent of gunshot wound was a
proximate cause of death). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 11 (1950).
26 See Green, supra note 12, at 556.
27 Malone, supra note 12, at 67.
28 W. PRossER, supra note 12, § 41, at 241-42; see 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1042 (1964).
29 27 Ohio St. 2d at 253-54, 272 N.E.2d at 104 (emphasis added); see, e.g., cases cited
note 25 supra.
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The difficulty presented for the plaintiff by coupling the "but for"
test with the "probability" standard of proof is apparent. Basically, in
a situation such as the Cooper case, the plaintiff is trying to demonstrate
that the decedent would have lived in the absence of defendant's
negligence, thus establishing defendant's negligence as "the cause"
of death. On the other hand, defendant is trying to show that the
decedent probably would have died anyway, thus establishing the
seriousness of the ailment (brain injury) as "the cause." Thus in Cooper,
where the "probabilities" were pretty well balanced, the plaintiff's
problem becomes evident:
When the defendant can argue the existence of a competing cause,
he is in a position to avail himself of a powerful forensic weapon ....

[W]here the chances are in even mathematical balance

and there are only two plausible causal alternatives--either A or
B-we are likely to insist on some positive assurance that A, not
B, was the cause. In such cases our reaction is sharply tempered by
our sense of contrast. The probabilities formula stares us boldly in
the face, and there is no means of escape through resort to the
subtle shades of factual likelihood ....

[W]e must either submit to

the probabilities formula or else flout it openly.3 0
Professor Leon Green, a noted authority on causation,3 1 also
acknowledged the problem confronting plaintiffs when the "but for"
and "probabilities" criteria are utilized in labeling either A or B as the
cause, and proposed a more "orthodox" approach:
[The probabilities rule] has the same vice as the "but-for" test ...
it takes the focus off the defendant's conduct and goes abroad for
other causes ....

The issue is whether defendant's conduct contri-

buted to the victim's injury. To turn the issue into whether the
defendant's conduct caused the injury is a different issue, and then
to require that defendant's conduct must be found to be more
probable than not the cause of the injury completely perverts the
32
original issue.
While Professor Green's approach does not derogate the axiom that
defendant's conduct must be a "necessary antecedent" to the harm for it
to be causal, its importance lies in the fact that there is implicit in his
use of the term "contributed" the idea that there is, as in virtually any
30 Malone, supra note 12, at 82.

31 Other works on causation by Professor Green include: The Wagon Mound No. 2Foreseeability Revised, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 197; Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41
TEx. L. REV. 42 (1962).
32 Green, supra note 12, at 557 (emphasis added). Note that the "contribution" approach still does not do away with the "necessary antecedent" requirement, It merely
emphasizes the fact that there can be two or more necessary antecedents. See Connellan v.
Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 142, 187 A. 901, 903 (1936).
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occurrence, more than one force or instrumentality at work." Accordingly, the concept of contribution does not require the court or jury
to think of cause in terms of "solely A" or "solely B," and somewhat
alleviates plaintiff's burden of showing, in a borderline case, it was
probably A. The underlying basis for this contention is that if the trier
of fact thinks of cause in terms of "solely A" or "solely B," it is implicit
in this thinking that, if the instrumentality alleged to be causal (such
as the doctor's negligence) never occurred, no harm would have come
about at all. It is submitted that the jury will find this difficult to accept
when the "other" instrumentality (such as a severe brain injury) is of
serious consequence. 34 Professor Green puts special emphasis on situations similar to the one that confronted the plaintiff in Cooper:
The causal relation issue does not change its character; it is still,
did defendant's conduct in failing to provide safety facilities contribute to the victim's injury? To ask whether he would have
escaped unscathed had the facilities been provided may present a
false issue heavily weighted against the victim and one that can
35
seldom, if ever, be answered.
Essentially this same idea is advanced by Professor Malone who
advocates the use of the "substantial factor" formula in such cases. 36
Even though, as evidenced by the Restatement, the "necessary antecedent" criterion is elemental in labeling conduct a "substantial factor,"
use of this term offers the same advantages as using the term "contribution"-it does not require the court or jury to think in terms of cause
33 It is axiomatic that any given event is the product of a multitude of causes. See
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 41, at 239.
84 For an excellent example of a court unduly influenced by this type of thinking,
see Ramberg v. Morgan, 209 Iowa 474, 218 N.W. 492 (1928) (plaintiff alleged defendant
doctor's failure to properly diagnose decedent's brain injury resulted in delay in treatment
and eventual death).
85 Green, supra note 12, at 559.
36 Malone, supra note 12, at 94-97. Though, as evidenced by § 431(a) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

(1965), the "substantial factor" test is designed for general ap-

plication and incorporates the "necessary antecedent" requirement for proving causation, it
originally received its primary application in situations wherein the harm was brought
about by two or more concurrent causes, each sufficient by itself to cause the harm. In
such situations the "but for" rule was inapplicable since none of the causes was a necessary
antecedent to the harm; thus, use of the rule would exempt all wrongdoers from liability.
See, e.g., Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902) (two motorcycles simultaneously
passing plaintiff's horse frightened it and caused it to run away); Anderson v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920) (defendant's train set fire which
combined with fire of unknown origin to burn plaintiff's property). This special application
of the "substantial factor" test is provided for in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2)
(1965).
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as "solely A" or "solely B," with the aforementioned hardships on plain
tiff.
Sometimes it [the substantial factor formula] is used in conjunction
with the but-for rule, and in these cases it seems fairly clear that
the term "substantial factor" serves to soften the edge of the probabilities formula considerably and permits a large range of
37
speculation concerning the factual likelihoods involved.
It would certainly appear that if the Cooper court had altered its policy
and adopted a "substantial factor" or "contribution" approach to causation, as opposed to the "but for" A or B approach, the case would
have at least reached the jury, possibly with a different outcome.
While courts appear to be in general agreement as to the burden
of proof required to prove causation and, consequently, the point at
which plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to raise the causation
issue for jury consideration, it has been observed that the court's power
to determine whether plaintiff has reached this point "is seldom given
the importance to which it is entitled."3 8 Examination of a few cases
indicates that the use of words like "possible," "probable," "reasonable,"
and "likelihood" afford a judge a wide range of discretion capable of
being exercised for or against a plaintiff when he feels that a particular
case so requires.

In the case of Houston v. Republican Athletic Association,"9 plaintiff alleged that defendant's negligent maintenance of a stairway caused
the fall and ensuing death of her husband. She claimed that, "'if a jury
could draw a reasonable inference' " from the evidence that defendant's
negligent maintenance of the stairway was the proximate cause of the
accident, the case should be submitted to the jury. 40 The court rejected
this contention, stating:
In the absence of any direct proof as to the manner in which
the accident occurred, the burden was on [plaintiff] to produce evidence of circumstances "so strong as to preclude the possibility of
injury in any other way and provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion" that her husband's death was caused by the
negligence of [defendants] in the manner alleged. 41
37 Malone, supra note 12, at 94-95. See, e.g., Graham v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 995 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (dentist's delay in referring patient to specialist found to be a substantial factor
in bringing about injury without regard to probabilities).
38 Green, supra note 12, at 553; see Malone, supra note 12, at 68-72.
39 343 Pa. 218, 22 A.2d 715 (1941).
40 Id. at 220, 22 A.2d at 716.
41

Id.
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In the aforementioned case, as in others, 42 the court, in evaluating
the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence, has used a very stringent standard
when compared to the "reasonable probability" standard usually encountered in most cases, including malpractice. 43 However, when the
courts have felt justice so required, they have, as a matter of policy,
somewhat "relaxed" the "sufficiency" criterion in order to allow the
case to go to the jury. The particular situations where this has been
done have varied, and the malpractice area has not been excepted from
the vicissitudes of policy. In the case of Garfield Memorial Hospital v.
Marshall,44 plaintiff claimed that the defendant hospital's negligent
conduct during the birth of her baby, allowing the baby to strike its
head on the delivery table, was the proximate cause of the brain injury
and spastic condition suffered by the child. 45 Although no witness could
testify that such was the case, the court was not very demanding in
allowing the case to go to the jury:
[T]he jury had before it the undisputed fact that the baby's soft
skull struck the mat-covered metal table, the expert opinion that
such an incident could injure the brain so as to produce spasticity,
and the conceded fact that subsequently spasticity developed. In
those circumstances the inference that the blow on the head
caused the child's present condition cannot be said to be unsupported by probative facts or to
be so unreasonable as to warrant
46
taking the case from the jury.
While the aforementioned policy considerations are employed on
a case-by-case basis, apparently determined by the particular factual situations and judicial sympathy, the breach of certain limited duties designed to protect a limited class of persons has resulted in broad-based
policies which are at considerable variance with traditional causation
42 For cases where courts have not been satisfied by "mere probability," see Lanier v.
Trammell, 207 Ark. 372, 180 S.W.2d 818 (1944) (court required that "strong probability"
Sf causation be proved to find surgeon's negligence responsible for plaintiff's
eye infection);
Mayes v. McKeithen, 213 So. 2d 340 (La. App.), cert. denied, 252 La. 965, 215 So.
2d 130 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969) (court not satisfied that probability-ofcausation link between defendant's intoxication and auto accident satisfied burden of
proof).
43 Cases cited note 24 supra.
44 204 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
45 Id. at 722-24.
46 Id. at 728 (emphasis added). Other courts have used the broad language available
to skirt the "probabilities" approach, allowing plaintiff to establish his claim when the
evidence "reasonably tends" to establish essential facts, directly, indirectly, or inferentially.
See, e.g., Sisler v. Jackson, 460 P.2d 903 (Okla. 1969) (claim that defendant doctor's improper hip surgery was proximate cause of leg disability upheld on evidence reasonably
tending to support allegations).
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standards. A prime example is the breach of the statutory duty to provide fire escapes in buildings of a certain height, 47 with the resulting
death of guests during a fire. Although in many cases it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to show that absent defendant's
negligence the decedent probably would have lived, courts will allow
the case to go to the jury if it is not shown conclusively that the decedent would have had no chance to avail himself of the safeguard had
it been provided.

48

Another example is the duty of the master of a ship to make an
attempt to rescue a seaman who has fallen overboard. 49 It is virtually
impossible for a plaintiff to show that the decedent seaman probably
would have lived if the master of the ship had made a rescue attempt,
but the case of Gardnerv. National Bulk Carriers,Inc.50 is illustrative
of the attitude of the courts:
Proximate cause, the ship urges, has not been proved ...
But this view ignores the underlying character of the duty. It was
less than a duty to rescue him, but it was a positive duty to make a
sincere attempt at rescue. The duty is of such nature that its omission will contribute to cause the seaman's death. The duty arises
when there is a reasonable possibility of rescue. Proximate cause is
tested by the same standard, i.e., causation is proved if the master's
omission destroys the reasonable possibility of rescue. 5
Other examples, such as the failure to provide a lifeguard at a public
swimming pool where a swimmer drowns, 52 defendant's serving of
intoxicants to minors and intoxicated persons with resultant injuries
to third persons, 5 failure of a housing authority to provide safety faciliSee, e.g., N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 55:13A-7 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1221 (1964).
See Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky. 609, 203 S.W. 555 (1918); Lee v. Carwile,
168 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 1964); Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House, Inc., 224 App. Div.
232, 230 N.Y.S. 44 (1928), aff'd, 250 N.Y. 574, 166 N.E. 329 (1929).
49 See, e.g., Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932); Barrios v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 290 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Reinauer Oil Transp., Inc.,
256 F.2d 646 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958); Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co.,
112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940); Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931); Tweedy
v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 190 F. Supp. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 921 (2nd Cir. 1961).
50 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963); see Annot., 91 A.L.R.
2d 1032 (1963).
51 310 F.2d at 287 (emphasis added).
52 See Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 591, 291
P. 848 (1930); YMCA v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 417, 130 S.E.2d 242 (1963).
58 E.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959):
[A] tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the
ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his
negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries......
The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were
normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability.
47
48
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ties in an apartment complex having a high crime rate, 54 and an employer's liability under the Federal Employers Liability Act 55 are illustrative
of courts being satisfied with far less than the "but for" and "probabilities" approach to causation.
Judicial policy towards cases of this type, although resulting in a
departure from the "standard" rules as to the sufficiency of causation
evidence, appears to be founded on principles of elemental fairness and
has strong support in legal logic.
Some rules of conduct, particularly those that are extracted
from the broad notion we call negligence, cover a vague, indefinite
area of risk that escapes all efforts of advance charting. Other
rules of conduct were designed for fairly narrow and definite
purposes. The precise reasons for their existence can be fathomed
without too much difficulty. Whenever it can be said with fair
certainty that the rule of conduct relied upon by-the plaintiff was
designed to protect against the very type of risk to -which the
plaintiff was exposed, courts have shown very little patience with
the efforts of defendant to question the sufficiency of the proof on
cause. 5 6

Rules demanding the provision of fire 'escapes, the searching, for lost
seamen, the stationing of lifeguards and other safeguards are all designed to give a certain class of persons, subject to a limited and defined
risk, the chance to escape the particular injury. The fact that defendant
deprived plaintiff of the very chance to escape injury that he was under
Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9. See Note, Liability of Tavern Keepers for Injurious"Consequences
of Illegal Sales of Intoxicating Liquors, 20 LA. L. REv. 800 (1960); Note, Increasing the
Liability of New Jersey Taverns: Where to Draw the Line?, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 235
(1971); Note, Common Law Liability of the Liquor Vendor, 18 W. REs. L. RFv. 251 (1966);
Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833 (1961).
54 Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (defendant held responsible for rape and murder of a 9-year-old girl due to failure to provide
adequate police facilities that could have saved her life):
When the Bass girl broke loose ... and ran around the roof of her building, there
was a gambling chance that her attacker would have been frightened away had
she reached and activated such a phone and signal light. But, there was not any
on that roof and therefore we will never know.
Id. at 473, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (emphasis added).
55 Albergo v. Reading Co., 372 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 983 (1967)
is an excellent example of judicial standards as to sufficiency of evidence under F.E.L.A.:
The test of a jury case "is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury 0 0 0 for which damages are sought."
Id. at 85 (quoting from Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957)); )Daniel v.
Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 389 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1968); Shea v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 316
F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1963); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 653 (1964).
56 Malone, supra note 12, at 73.
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a duty to provide, and the fact that the "but for" and "probabilities"
criteria would provide an almost insurmountable burden for plaintiff,
account for the relaxation of the traditional standards.
However this may be in the outlined situations, such a policy has
not found appreciable support in malpractice cases, and the reasons for
such an outlook are plain:
In view of the protective attitude of the law toward the medical profession we should not expect that courts will manifest any
eagerness to permit the jury to find that the physician's carelessness
was a cause-in-fact of the patient's harm or his worsened condition .... . It is not enough that different treatment would have increased the likelihood that the victim would have fared better.
This would throw the physician open to more claims than it is felt
would be proper It is not enough that an expert is willing to estimate that better treatment would have increased the patient's
chance from . . . twenty to forty percent. The gambler's chance

which we found the court willing
to protect in the fire cases has
57
no place in the malpractice suit.

Despite the strong policy considerations favoring defendant doctors with respect to the causation issue, the Fourth Circuit, by way of
dictum, in the 1966 case of Hicks v. United States,58 substantially departed from the traditionally required standards of proof. Plaintiff
brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages for the death of the wife of a naval enlisted man, alleging that the
negligence of a naval doctor in failing to correctly diagnose and treat
the decedent was a cause-in-fact of her death.59 The district court found
"the evidence on both the negligence and causation issues was insufficient
and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals held that the doctor
was negligent in failing to observe the requisite standard of care
in diagnosing decedent's ailment. 60 The factual pattern was similar to
Cooper., In both cases the physician, failing to observe the requisite
standard of care in diagnosing the decedent's ailment, determined the
ailment to be something less serious than it actually was and sent the
patient home with death resulting. It is important to note the particular conduct of the physician that was subject to inquiry when comparing
57
58

id. at 86-87 (footnote omitted).
368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966); see Note, supra .note 20.

368 F.2d at 628.
6o id. at 630. Though the district court found that negligence was not established,
the court of appeals found that finding to be "clearly erroneous" and upset it pursuant to
FED. R. Cav. P. 52(a).
59
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the Hicks case with the previously mentioned safeguard situations.
The Hicks court made special mention of the defendant doctor's
duty and his conduct with respect to that duty:
It would seem . . .that where the symptoms are consistent with
either of two possible conditions, one lethal if not attended to
promptly, due care demands that a doctor do more than make a
cursory examination and then release the patient.61
The court made this statement in distinguishing a mere error in judgment from a breach of duty, and on that basis imputed negligence.
On the issue of causation, plaintiff's experts testified categorically
that, if operated on promptly, the decedent would have lived. 2 This,
by itself, would have established a jury question, but the court went a
step further:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the
chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If there
was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has
destroyed it, he is answerable.... The law does not in the existing
circumstances require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the
patient would have lived ....63
The court then went on to analogize between the Hicks situation and
the rescue-of-seamen doctrine, citing Gardneras an example in point.6 4
However, in concluding its opinion, the court pointed out that "[s]ince
the uncontradicted testimony was that with prompt surgery she would
have survived," the doctor's negligence was the proximate cause of
65
death.
The same court, in Clark v. United States,66 made the Hicks case
even more difficult to analyze, stating that "[c]ertainly Hicks laid down
no new rule of law with respect to either negligence or proximate
cause."6 7 Judge Boreman, dissenting on other grounds, agreed with the
court's interpretation of Hicks, and, remarking on the reference that
Hicks made to the rescue of seamen, he posited that it was "used as an
analogy... [and] was not intended to lay down a principle of tort law
supplanting long-established ...rules." 8
61 368 F.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 632.
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 632-33.
65 Id. at 633.
66 402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968).
67 Id. at 953 nA.
68 ld. at 955-56.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 3:505

Despite the uncertainty involved in the Hicks decision, the case
received more than cursory treatment in later decisions. In the case of
Schuler v. Berger,69 plaintiff claimed that defendant's failure to administer certain therapeutic measures was negligence and the proximate
cause of decedent's death. Plaintiff's expert witness, responding to a
hypothetical question, testified that, had certain enumerated steps been
taken, the decedent "would have lived." 70 The defendant claimed that
the enumeration of various conditions in the hypothetical inquiry put
to the witness made his answer conjectural in nature and thus insufficient to raise the causation issue. The court rejected this contention,
citing the Hicks reference to the "substantial possibility" test.71 As in

the Hicks case, however, the testimony, as construed by the court, indicated that the deceased "would have lived"; therefore, the decision did
not rest on the Hicks dictum.
In the case of Brown v. United States,72 plaintiff, in an action
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claimed that the negligent
failure of a doctor to inform the decedent's regular physician of decedent's condition resulted in a failure to hospitalize the decedent and,
consequently, his eventual death. The court pointed out that it was
difficult to assess to what extent decedent's chances would have been
increased with proper treatment and, noting plaintiff's reliance on
Hicks' "substantial possibility" language, the court stated:
We accept the principle stated in Hicks for the purpose of
this appeal but think more elaboration on this principle would be
called for if proximate cause were a controlling issue in this case.73
Jeanes v. Milner,74 decided by the Eighth Circuit, dealt squarely
with the Hicks decision. Plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the defendant
doctors' delay in forwarding decedent's biopsies for further evaluation
was a proximate cause of decedent's death due to cancer. The theory
underlying plaintiff's contention was that, had the slides been promptly
forwarded to other experts, the cancer would have been discovered at
a much earlier date, at which time treatment might have saved the
decedent's life. The only expert testimony introduced on plaintiff's
behalf was to the effect that, if the cancer had been treated at stage one
in its development, decedent would have had a 35 percent chance of
69 275 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 395 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1968).
70 Id. at 123.
71 Id. at 123-24.
72 419 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1969).
73 Id. at 339 n.2.
74 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
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living, while if the disease was already in stage two at the time of discovery, the chance of survival was only 24 percent. 75 The evidence indicated that, due to the delay, the disease progressed from stage one to
stage two before detection. The district court found that such evidence
was sufficient for a jury determination on the negligence question, but
would not suffice to present the proximate cause issue for determination. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that "[w]e also find Hicks
v. United States . . . to be persuasive here," and cited the relevant
portion of the Hicks decision espousing the "substantial possibility"
criterion.7"
The question of the sufficiency of evidence needed to present
the causation issue to the jury is one intertwined with judicial policy
considerations and certainly policy can be viewed differently by different courts. If, in fact, one were to view the Hicks case as espousing
the "substantial possibility" doctrine and the one to be adopted in certain instances of malpractice, which is apparently what some courts have
done, the similarity between the "diligence in diagnosis" situation and
the "fire escape," "seaman," "lifeguard" and other situations discussed,
supports such a viewpoint. The duty to use diligence in diagnosing an
ailment is a limited duty. It has a limited and a specifically defined
purpose. The persons who come within its range of protection are a
limited class and it is designed to protect them against the very risk to
which they are exposed by its breach.
However valid the analogy may be, it was never considered by the
Cooper court, which measured plaintiff's argument alongside the traditional standards for proving causation:
Although the words "substantial possibility" are employed as
articulating a standard of proof, the facts in Hicks reveal that plaintiffs' [sic] evidence satisfied a much higher standard of proof..
The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally
direct us toward a conclusion that in an action for wrongful death
an injured person should be compensated for the loss of any chance
for survival, regardless of its remoteness. However, we have trepidations that such a rule would be so loose that it would produce more
injustice than justice. 77
The contrasting results achieved in two factually similar cases offer
a final example of the necessity for the law to reconsider whether its
attitude towards the medical profession, its cloak of protectiveness,
75 Id. at 604; see Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 461 (1957).
78 428 F.2d at 605.
77 27 Ohio St. 2d at 251-52, 272 N.E.2d at 103.
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should be so general in application. In the case of Dunham v. Village
of Canisteo,78 plaintiff's intestate, suffering from the cold, was found
on the floor of the village fire station. Village authorities took the man
to jail and, believing him to be merely intoxicated, put him in a cell to
recover. He awoke during the night and, complaining of pain, requested a doctor who was not summoned. Six hours later, the jail authorities, realizing he was in pain, sent him to the hospital where, seven
days later, he died of pneumonia. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's
delay in procuring medical assistance was a proximate cause of decedent's death. One of plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that early
treatment is an "important factor" in effecting a cure and, in his opinion, the defendant's delay contributed to the death. 79 He also testified
that, even if decedent had received the best and most timely medical
treatment, he might have developed pneumonia and died anyway. 0 The
court, determining the question to be whether the defendant's acts or
omissions "substantially contributed" to the death, applied the "substantial factor" formula and left the "necessary antecedent" implications for the jury to resolve:
Ve cannot say as a matter of law ...

that the delay in this case

of eighteen hours commencing shortly after serious injury to a
man seventy-six years of age was not a substantial factor for the
jury to consider in determining the cause of his death.8 x
The Dunham case stands in strong contrast to the case of Ramberg
v. Morgan.8 2 In Ramberg, plaintiff's intestate was struck by a car and
hurled thirty-five feet to the pavement. The driver of the car brought
him to jail and a doctor was summoned. The defendant doctor, after
making a visual examination of the still unconscious man and diagnosing the problem as intoxication, left the decedent on the cement floor
of the jail. Thirty-six hours later, decedent was finally taken home and,
a full five days later, he died of brain injuries received in the accident.
Plaintiff brought an action against the doctor claiming that the doctor's
negligent diagnosis of decedent's condition resulted in an unnecessary
delay in securing proper treatment, and thus was a proximate cause of
death. The trial court refused to direct a verdict for defendant and,
78 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952). This case is discussed in Malone, supra note
12, at 95.
79 303 N.Y. at 504, 104 N.E.2d at 876.

80

Id.

81 Id.
82

at 506, 104 N.E.2d at 877.
209 Iowa 474, 218 N.W. 492 (1928).

1972]

NO TES

upon appeal, the court found a sufficient question of negligence for -the
jury and declared its criterion for allowing the jury to pass upon the
causation question:
[I]t was necessary for the jury to find, upon proper evidence, that
the death.of the decedent would not have occurred 8 ..
. but for
against the defendant. 3

the alleged negligence charged

On the causation issue, none of plaintiff's witnesses could testify
with any degree of certainty that the decedent would have lived but
for the delay in treatment, though they agreed that the fact that decedent was still alive 48 hours after the accident indicated that he had
"a better chance of life" than that usually associated with serious brain
injuries. 84 The court was not satisfied with this evidence and sustained
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, stating:
The record in the case at bar emphasizes the fact that any
conclusion with reference to the cause of death as being referable to
the defendant's negligence is mere conjecture, and falls far short
85
of that reasonable certainty which the law requires ....
Although it is not suggested that the court used the strict "but for"
approach merely because the defendant was a doctor, the contrast between the viewpoints of the courts in Dunham and Ramberg serves to
underscore the difference that judicial policy can make when dealing
with virtually the same factual situation.
From the foregoing discussion, one may conclude that, in the interest of justice, there are two ways a court may modify policy in order
to alleviate somewhat plaintiff's burden in certain malpractice cases.
The first method would be to use a straight "substantial factor" approach, as advocated by the Dunham court and section 431(a) of the
Restatement, thereby taking the emphasis off the "but for" rule and
leaving the "necessary antecedent" criterion, still an essential ingredient
of the causal relationship, for the jury to ponder without forcing them
to think solely in those terms. The second method, certainly more radical, would be to recognize that the physician's duty to use reasonable
diligence in forming a diagnosis encompasses the "risk" interest within
its range of protection, and thus allows the jury to find defendant's
conduct a substantial factor (and impliedly a necessary antecedent)
merely upon a showing of a "substantial possibility" of recovery. It
83
84
85

Id. at 483, 218 N.W. at 497 (emphasis added).
Id. at 486, 218 N.W. at 498.
Id. at 484. 218 N.W. at 497.
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does not appear unreasonable for the law to require that the physician
at least avail himself of the necessary and readily available diagnostic
tools when corifronted with a potentially serious ailment, and, in view
of the decision in Cooper, a change is warranted.
Stephen Horn

